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Given the continued need for human eggs for hESCs, this article analyzes and refutes the legal theories
against compensating research egg donors, contrasts the legal histories of compensating reproductive
donors and human subjects with noncompensation for ESC donors, and suggests that limited compensation
is legally defensible.With a change of administrations in the
United States and renewed support
for human embryonic stem cell (hESC)
research, there may be an opportunity
to reassess the legal principles and theo-
ries involved in payments to research
egg donors in this country and to con-
sider how the legal system might impact
this ongoing debate. In this rapidly
moving field, many observers and some
researchers have argued that develop-
ments in both adult stem cell research
and more recently induced pluripotent
stem cell (iPSC) research should obviate
the need for donated research eggs.
However, adult stem cells have already-
recognized limitations and the jury is
still very much out as to whether iPSCs
will ever replace hESCs in terms of clin-
ical potential. Moreover, each of these
research paths carries the potential of
enhancing advances in the other areas
and in understanding early human devel-
opment, indicating that there is a con-
tinued need for donated research eggs
(Cibelli, 2009). Anecdotally, the present
dearth in research egg donors has been
repeatedly traced to an inability to
compensate them. One recent study of
reproductive donors found that most
of these individuals were interested in
donating for embryonic research, but only
2% were willing to do so without com-
pensation (Klitzman and Sauer, 2009).
Although the legal issues should be of
worldwide interest, given the range of
international laws and policies, this article
is limited to a discussion of compensating
research egg donors within the United
States. It reviews both the legal back-
ground in the United States and various
legal arguments that have been made
regarding compensation for egg donationand then suggests the viability of a
legal defense for modest compensation
to research egg donors under the same
protections and principles applied to
other human research subjects.
With few exceptions (such as the 2009
decision by New York state’s Empire
State Stem Cell Board to allow research
donor compensation), current compensa-
tion practices for research egg donors
stand in stark contrast to such policies
for both healthy human research subjects
and reproductive egg donors. Policies
prohibiting donor payments or permitting
research use of only ‘‘spare’’ IVF embryos
have been incorporated into otherwise
pro-hESC research legislation and volun-
tary restrictions by professional organiza-
tions. These restrictions codify into law or
guidelines ideological perspectives that
may lack objectivity, scientific acumen,
or the flexibility needed to adapt to antic-
ipated advances in this fast emerging
and promising field. From a legal perspec-
tive, the discussion should be about how
best to protect these healthy human
subjects through established protocols,
rather than how to appease opponents
of hESC research through restrictive stat-
utory provisions.
The Law and Legal Theories
Generally speaking, the law attempts to
shape behavior both prospectively by
enacting statutes and guidelines and
creating entities such as licensing bodies
to address certain behaviors set out
by those acts and by making courts avail-
able to individuals and the government
to redress actions that allegedly offend
those laws or existing theories of constitu-
tional, criminal, tort, or contract law.
Both approaches are relevant in theCell Stem Cellarena of payments to research egg
donors, and any legal defense of compen-
sating research egg donors must recog-
nize the existing paradigms and theories
that currently impact this issue.
Opponents of compensating research
egg donors suggest that paying these
women is coercive, unduly influences
poor or otherwise vulnerable women
to put themselves at risk, and commod-
ifies eggs and that it is simply wrong to
‘‘create life to destroy it.’’ However, none
of these arguments withstand careful
legal scrutiny.
Coercion
Legally speaking, coercion occurs when
forces are exerted upon an individual
such that his or her free will is removed,
and any subsequent actions are consid-
ered to be involuntary. A common legal
example is holding a gun to someone’s
head to force them to act in a way they
would not otherwise. Regardless of how
one feels about compensating research
egg donors, it does not follow that modest
proposed financial compensation would
remove a potential egg donor’s free will.
In fact, given that Hwang lab members
have alleged that professional pressures
induced them to donate oocytes for their
employer’s studies, coercion (and undue
influence) is more likely a result of such
pressure on would-be donors than large
sums of money (Chong and Normile,
2006). Compensation for human subjects,
including men, women, and children, is
a commonly accepted principle, accom-
panied by established protections and
approved protocols. Only in response to
potential donations involving women’s
reproductive potential are such calls of
coercion voiced and frequently prevail
(Vogel, 2006). To suggest that paying6, February 5, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 99
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call into question the voluntariness and
free will of virtually every compensated
reproductive egg donor as well as every
healthy human research subject.
Undue Influence
‘‘Undue influence’’ is the more accurate
legal construct to argue against compen-
sating egg donors. In contrast to ‘‘coer-
cion,’’ undue influence is a legal theory
that in some circumstances, an induce-
ment is so substantial, or the person
offering it is in such a position of relative
power, that it unfairly impacts or influ-
ences a person’s actions. (Hyun, 2006).
Such concerns have been raised in the
United States over offering an infertility
patient who cannot afford treatment a
free or discounted IVF cycle if she agrees
to split her eggs with another patient,
essentially making her both a donor and
a recipient.
The various compensation amounts
proposed for research egg donors are a
fraction of that paid to reproductive egg
donors: some of the larger suggested
amounts have been $1,000 to $1,500,
compared to an accepted range of
$5,000–$10,000 for reproductive donors
(see Ethics Committee of the Ameri-
can Society of Reproductive Medicine
[ASRM], 2007). On one hand, it seems
unlikely that a prospective research
donor who also had an option to donate
for reproduction would be unduly influ-
enced by the relatively small sum that
researchers would offer. On the other
hand, some potential research donors
may not be eligible to serve as reproduc-
tive donors because of their education,
health, or socioeconomic strata and
thereby be arguably more susceptible to
lower remuneration offered them as
a research donor. The opposite argument
may also apply, given that older women
with established families and lifestyles
may also be interested in research dona-
tion, but less susceptible to financial
inducements than young reproductive
donors. The question of determining what
is and isn’t undue influence suggests the
need for clear, sensitive, factually based
and appropriate compensation guidelines
reflecting compensation for a donor’s
time, effort, risk, and inconvenience and
not for the eggs themselves.
Commodification
Another frequently voiced argument is
that paying egg donors reduces their100 Cell Stem Cell 6, February 5, 2010 ª2010eggs to commodities. However, many
research donors are paid for their time
and discomfort. In these cases, following
rigorous IRB protocol and safeguards
allows modest remuneration that reflects
approximate and reasonable compensa-
tion for the time, effort, inconvenience,
and risk undertaken by these healthy
research subjects, as opposed to pay-
ment for their donated tissue. The ISSCR
supports such an approach in the case
of research oocyte donation by approving
compensation provided that appropriate
rates are determined by individual
jurisdictions. At their core, commodifica-
tion concerns are an argument against
exceedingly and unjustifiably high pay-
ments, an issue rooted in the existing
context of reproductive donation in which
compensation guidelines are at times
only loosely followed. Given that hESC
research doesn’t care about a donor’s
SAT scores, athletic prowess, or hair or
eye color, setting appropriate compensa-
tion amounts for research donors may
actually help model more appropriate
compensation guidelines for reproductive
donors.
Procreation versus Research
A final, largely ethical argument put forth
by opponents is that donation for pro-
creation is a greater good because it
helps create life, which justifies existing
discrepant payment paradigms. Yet,
a survey of reproductive egg donors
revealed that they were evenly split in their
preference for research or reproductive
donations (Klitzman and Sauer, 2009).
Undoubtedly, some donors, ethicists,
and policy makers have stronger feelings
about either procreation or research,
but in a pluralistic society those individ-
uals’ values should not be adopted
into law.
A Brief Legal History of IVF, Egg
Donation, and Fetal Research
Considering the histories of compen-
sating reproductive donors and the legal
restrictions on embryonic research in the
United States may aid in forging future
laws and policies. Both egg donation
and ESC research became possible only
after IVF created the novel ability to create
ex utero embryos some 30 years ago.
Both have evolved in the large shadow
of a national abortion debate fueled by
the Supreme Court’s decision in Roe
v. Wade (1973).Elsevier Inc.Over the past two decades, reproduc-
tive egg donation has evolved from an
informal, empathetic response by rela-
tives and friends into an industry compa-
rable to sperm donation, but with added
medications, procedures, and attendant
risks and significantly greater remunera-
tion. Egg freezing, although still consid-
ered experimental, is increasingly avail-
able and promoted and will probably
transform the field further in terms of
medical protocols, remuneration, and
providing potentially ‘‘spare’’ eggs for
future research donation. It is also impor-
tant to recognize that, in terms of known
safety risks, the technology and medical
risks associated with egg stimulation
and retrieval have been undertaken by
IVF patients since the early 1980s.
Reproductive donors are currently re-
cruited by patients, ART medical pro-
grams, and separate recruiting pro-
grams, over the Internet, and elsewhere.
In contrast to research donors (and laws
in other countries), compensation for
reproductive egg donors is accepted
practice in the United States with no
federal laws prohibiting such payments.
A federal and model uniform law that
each regulate and restrict compensation
for organ donations do not encompass
egg donations from live donors. The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA,
1968) restricts payments for body parts
that are removed after the death of
the donor, whereas the National Organ
Transplant Act (NOTA, 1984) prohibits
‘‘valuable consideration’’ for a list of
defined ‘‘organs’’ and expressly denies
payment for related expenses such as
travel and lost wages. NOTA’s criminal
penalties are primarily aimed at prevent-
ing the sale of nonrenewable solid organs,
including kidneys, livers, hearts, and eyes,
which could compromise a donor’s health
and well-being. Ironically, bone marrow is
explicitly included as an ‘‘organ’’ although
it is renewable in a matter of weeks,
whereas eggs are not included. (Although
eggs are nonrenewable, many analogize
them to renewable tissue such as blood
and sperm on the theory that females
are born with many more eggs than they
can ever use in their lifetime). The first
lawsuit to challenge the constitutionality
of NOTA was filed by Doreen Flynn,
a mother of three children who could
benefit from bone marrow transplants
(Flynn v. Holder, 2009). Flynn argues the
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equal protection and substantive due pro-
cess rights by arbitrarily treating renew-
able bone marrow like nonrenewable
solid organs, rather than like blood—or,
ironically, eggs. The government must
only prove a rational basis, the lowest
legal standard to pass constitutional mus-
ter, but regardless of the ultimate out-
come, the issues raised by the case
could impact debate over compensating
research egg donors, as well.
In the absence of legal restrictions on
compensation within the United States,
payments to reproductive donors are
limited only by general tort law or profes-
sional guidelines. Voluntary guidelines
and ethics statements issued by ASRM
permit per-cycle payments for donors
of approximately $5,000, and up to
$10,000 (Practice Committee of the
ASRM, 2006), and have recently required
any recruiting program listed on its Web
site (at last count over 80) to agree to
adhere to those principals. Although
frequently self-described as ‘‘agencies,’’
these entities are widely unregulated.
ASRM guidelines also state that compen-
sation is for a woman’s ‘‘time, inconve-
nience and discomfort’’ in undergoing
the rigors of donation, not for the eggs
themselves or for any specific donor qual-
ities (Practice Committee of the ASRM,
2006; Ethics Committee of the ASRM,
2007). Nonetheless, some reproductive
donors receive tens of thousands of
dollars from both individuals and recruit-
ing programs, as well as additional fees
for a desired ethnicity or proven fertility.
The legal history of fetal and embryonic
research is quite different. In the imme-
diate wake of Roe v. Wade, many states
enacted legislation to prohibit fetal tam-
pering or fetal ‘‘experimentation’’ and
defined the term ‘‘fetus’’ to include
‘‘embryo.’’ A number of those laws were
unclear and overbroad, and in 1990,
the ACLU joined a group of Illinois doc-
tors who successfully sued to have that
state’s statute voided for vagueness,
arguing they could not tell what forms
of research were or were not permissible
(Lifchez v. Hartigan, 1990). The Massa-
chusetts statute, enacted in 1974,
required research be approved by the
district attorney and provided criminal
penalties, including incarceration, for
anyone conducting any form of experi-
mentation using a live fetus, embryo, orneonate. In 1975, Dr. Kenneth Edelin,
then the chief resident in obstetrics and
gynecology at Boston Medical Center,
was convicted for performing a second-
trimester abortion after a nurse reported
he held the fetus’s head in the uterus
longer than necessary. The jury’s man-
slaughter conviction was subsequently
overturned on appeal (Commonwealth
v. Edelin, 1976), but the case is a searing
reminder of both the intensity of emotion
Roe v. Wade ignited and the willingness
of some to use the legal arena against
an individual to advance an ideological
agenda. Although almost a decade would
pass before IVF and cryopreservation
made research on ex utero embryos pos-
sible,manyof those lawsand theantiabor-
tion sentiments behind them are still in
force and impacting current debates over
ESC research (Crockin and Jones, 2010).
Current Embryo Research
Legislation
Thirty years later, the advent and potential
of ESC research has renewed legislative
and policy efforts to advance science
while appeasing both religious opponents
and some elements of feminist opposi-
tion. As with 1970s era legislation, results
have been mixed. In Massachusetts, fol-
lowing decades of researchers’ concerns
that their work might run afoul of the
existing statute, new legislation was
enacted in 2005, after lengthy hearings
(Massachusetts General Laws, 2005).
Numerous physicians, researchers, and
other experts testified, giving detailed
explanations of the science, technology,
hope, and limitations of hESC research.
Many senators noted it was the most
educational experience of their legislative
careers. It was a compelling example of
scientists managing to influence law and
policy. In the final days of the hearings,
however, opponents testified about
potential negative health impacts of
the procedures and warned that com-
pensation might make poor, minority
women risk their health to donate eggs.
Provisions inserted into the final legisla-
tion ban payments or ‘‘valuable con-
sideration’’ to research donors and man-
date that two documents be provided
to any woman undergoing egg retrieval:
a detailed ‘‘informational pamphlet’’
describing the potential health impacts
of the egg extraction process and a
mandatory ‘‘informed consent form.’’Cell Stem Cell 6A deep internal inconsistency also
appeared in the final legislation, with a
different section of the statute stating
that the law was not intended to regulate
reproductive IVF. With hESC research
proponents getting most of what they
fought for, the law passed to much
acclaim. Researchers have since found
the law’s compensation prohibitions
have severely impacted their ability to
attract egg donors for their research.
California’s 2004 stem cell law contains
a similar payment prohibition for research
egg donors. A 2008 Michigan law sup-
porting hESC research authorizes use of
only leftover IVF embryos for approved
research. Professional groups are split.
Voluntary guidelines issued by the Inter-
national Society for Stem Cell Research
endorse local IRB decision making
over compensation. Last year, New York
approved compensation for research
donors in that state. In contrast, the
National Academy of Sciences continues
to endorse only extremely limited reim-
bursement for direct expenses, although
in 2007–2008, it slightly relaxed its strict
payment moratorium to allow some out-
of-pocket reimbursement. ASRM has
criticized that position and supports
compensation for research donors (Ethics
Committee of the ASRM, 2007).
These compromise statutes and poli-
cies fail to recognize that compensat-
ing healthy human research subjects
(including children and other ‘‘vulnerable
subjects’’ with additional safeguards) is
an accepted, long-standing, and legally
recognized practice in medical research.
Rationales for compensation include
incentives to recruitment, overcoming dis-
incentives such as inertia and distrust,
reimbursement to reduce financial barriers
to participation, and fair compensation for
subjects’ time and inconvenience (Grady,
2005). The primary arguments against
such payments have focused on ethical—
not legal—concerns, whether compensa-
tion undercuts altruism, and the extent to
which compensation may threaten volun-
tary, informed consent (Hutt, 2003). Safe-
guards, including federal and state laws
and IRB approval, require a careful anal-
ysis and weighing of risks and benefits.
Moving Forward from a Legal
Perspective
Human research subjects have been
paid for over a century, within frameworks, February 5, 2010 ª2010 Elsevier Inc. 101
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influence on informed consent. Repro-
ductive sperm and egg donors are
routinely compensated to help create
children. Yet, compensating research
egg donors has become a virtual ‘‘third
rail’’ in the shaping of ESC research
policy. Given these two established
paradigms, the impassioned resistance
and resulting compromise laws and
policies are difficult to justify. Rather
than an ideologically based debate,
from a legal perspective, laws and poli-
cies can be crafted that address the
potential danger of undue influence
and commodification while incorporating
both protections and compensation for
healthy human research subjects under
long-established, if imperfect, methods.
Attempts to satisfy the ethical objections
of hESC research opponents should not
result in either disparate treatment for
reproductive versus research egg donors
or turning solely to research on adult
stem cells or iPSCs that cannot replace
the need for hESC research. Notably,
efforts that combine all avenues of stem
cell research may, in time, reduce the
number of eggs ultimately sought or
needed for stem cell research (Cibelli,
2009).102 Cell Stem Cell 6, February 5, 2010 ª2010In this burgeoning field, researchers
continually remind us not to put all our
proverbial eggs in one basket by
endorsing only iPSC or adult stem cell
research. In no other field involving human
research subjects are promising avenues
of inquiry cut off for purely ideological
reasons, whether through well-meaning
but problem-riddled legislation or well-
intended but politically compromised
voluntary guidelines. From a legal per-
spective, there is no justification to deny
researchers or those women who want
to be human subjects the opportunity to
move this promising science forward
under the same ethical, legal, and policy
paradigms that apply to every other area
of scientific inquiry. To force researchers,
potential human subjects, legislatures,
and society at large to reject compensa-
tion either because of the religious or
ideological views of one segment of the
population or the notion that female
research subjects uniquely need more
protections in this arena than in any
other—now that would be coercive.REFERENCES
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